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The petroleum industry of Iraq is characterized by 
the following important features: economies of scale, low
finding cost, high development cost, huge size of oil reserves, 
high productivity of oil wells, low cost of production, and 
favorable geological formations.
The published proved crude oil reserves are 35 billion 
barrels in 1976. However, such issue is still controversial 
and some sources give much higher estimates. Iraq plans to 
increase oil production to 4 million barrels daily by 1980. 
Should the 35 billion barrels not be promoted by new dis­
coveries, Iraq will have to reduce production and halt ex­
ports early in the 1990's in order to care for the rising 
domestic demand. On the other hand, should the reserves 
prove much higher than 35 billion barrels, Iraq will have 
ample amounts to produce and export well beyond the turn of 
the century.
Future world demand of oil and energy consumption 
balance indicate that Iraq will be able to export oil at 
least until the end of the century. Oil exports made an 
average of 95 percent of the total export value for the
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period 1969-74, while retained value made an average of 91 
percent of the total foreign exchange earnings of the country 
for the same period. These facts show that Iraq is heavily 
dependent on oil exports for its foreign exchange earnings 
and the correction of its balance of payments.
The oil production industry has been making an average 
of 30 percent of the Iraqi GDP for the period 1969-74. How­
ever, this substantial share is declining since most of the 
other sectors of the economy are growing at faster rates 
than the oil production sector. It is predicted that in 1980, 
the oil production industry will make only 25 percent of the 
Iraqi GDP.
Investment in the oil industry has been very modest. 
Gross fixed capital formation by the oil production industry 
has been making a small percentage of the gross domestic 
fixed capital formation. It peaked to 19 percent in 1960 
and dwindled to 0.3 percent in 1969. This share is rising 
and expected to continue as such until the end of this decade 
due to heavy investments in exploratory and development 
activities.
Oil revenues are being used to substitute for the low 
savings of the nation and hence make investment possible.
Most of the foreign exchange generated by oil exports is 
being used to finance the economic development plans, and
IV
COLORADO J>CH^ ann qq^qj
T-1885
by far this is the most important role of the oil industry 
in the country. However, dependence on oil revenues is being 
reduced in order to diversify the financial sources of in­
vestment.
Oil revenues financed about 30 percent of the ordinary 
budget until 1959 and about 40 percent of it until 1969.
From 1970 and onwards, this share fluctuated according to 
the magnitude of oil revenues reaching about 88 percent of 
the ordinary budget in 1974/75. Since the ordinary budget 
is mainly a budget of consumption, Iraq should find other 
means of financing this budget and the oil revenues should 
be directed towards investment and not deviated towards con­
sumption .
Due to the capital intensive nature of the oil industry, 
the size of its labor force is very small and the value added 
per worker is very high. Nevertheless, the oil industry 
benefitted the rest of the economy by supplying it, through 
its turnover, with much needed skilled manpower.
Backward linkage of the oil industry has no existence 
and forward linkage in terms of refining and petrochemical 
industries has been very weak. Although the projected in­
vestment in forward linkage activities is relatively sub­
stantial, Iraq should pay serious attention to investment 
in oil processing and petrochemical industries making full use
v
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of the very cheap and abundant inputs of crude oil and 
natural gas.
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Iraq is one of the Middle Eastern countries and part 
of the Arab nation. It is located at the northeast of the 
Arab Peninsula with a total area of about 170,000 square 
miles. Iraq is surrounded by Turkey from the north, Syria 
and Jordan from the west, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the 
Arabian Gulf from the south, and Iran from the east (see 
Figure 1).
Iraq's climate is hot and dry in summer, and cold to 
moderate in winter. The moisture is restricted to the winter 
months as is the case in other Mediterranean climate conditions. 
The desert forms about 37 percent of the total area of Iraq, 
while arable land forms about 35 to 40 percent of the re­
maining area.
The population of Iraq was estimated at about 11 million
in 1975 and is estimated to reach about 13 million in 1980.
The population growth rate is 3.3 percent and the adult 
literacy rate is about 25 percent.
The labor force was estimated at 2.94 million in 1974
and is expected to reach 3.63 million in 1980. About half
of the working force is engaged in agriculture.
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The discovery of oil in 1927 changed the future of 
the economy of Iraq. It became one of the major oil export­
ing countries, ranking fourth in the Middle East after Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, and Kuwait.
The economy of Iraq became an export economy in the 
sense that a single export, crude oil, accounted in 1974 for 
about 99 percent of the mineral exports; over 95 percent 
of the merchandise exports; about 90-95 percent of the 
countries foreign exchange receipts; about one-third of 
the GNP, and two-thirds of the ordinary budget.
The income derived from the sales, royalties, and 
taxes on crude oil production and exports not only provided 
the government with the major share of the funds for current 
expenditure, but also made possible the undertaking of 
broad plans for long term economic development.
Since 1927, when oil royalties were first received, 
until 1950, this income was treated as a budgetary surplus 
to be used for financing various capital projects. How­
ever, these royalties were relatively modest compared with 
subsequent years.
From 1950 and onward, a large percentage of the oil 
revenues were allocated to the economic development plans 
'which continued to rely heavily on oil revnues until this 
date. This source of income financed 88 percent of the in­
vestment program in 1970/71, 90 percent in 1971/72, 80 percent
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in 1972/73, 93 percent in 1973/74, and 88 percent of the 
investment program in 1974/75.
Hence, such a vital role of the petroleum industry is, 
indeed, worthy of investigation. The characteristics of 
the petroleum industry of Iraq are studied, together with 
the Iraqi petroleum reserves, and trends in production, con­
sumption and exports of crude oil. However, to make a 
thorough evaluation of the economic importance of this in­
dustry, the core of this thesis had to deal with the contri­
bution of this industry to the indigenous economy, i.e. the 
impact of the oil industry on the economy of Iraq.
The main objective of this study is, therefore, to in­
vestigate the main economic impact indicators of the oil in­
dustry. Specific attention is given to the effects of this 
industry on the GNP, capital formation, consumption and in­
vestment, employment, and the establishment of linkage industries. 
Along with this objective, a study is made as to how Iraq is 
endeavoring to surmount the obstacles to economic develop­
ment and to diversify the productive base of the economy 
rather than depend on a depletable resource export industry.
ARTHUR EAKES EIBRARU 
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SYMBOLS AND RATES OF CONVERSION
Use of slash (/) between dates indicates a fiscal or financial 
year, e.g., 1970/71.
Use of a hyphen (-) between dates signifies the full period 
involved, including the beginning and end years, e.g., 
1970-74.
Three dots (...) indicate that data are not available.
A dash (— ) indicates that the amount is nil or negligible.
Costs, receipts, investment, wages, etc., are mostly shown
in Iraqi Dinars (I.D.). The following exchange rates
can be used to convert to U.S .dollars:
Until 1971 I.D.l = $2.80
1972 I.D.l = $3.04
1973 and upwards I.D.l = $3.3 8
A long ton (2,240 lbs) equals 1.016 metric tons
A metric ton of crude oil equals 6 .5-8.2 barrels, depending 
on the specific gravity
Figures expressed in barrels per day may be converted,
approximately, into tons per annum by multiplying 
by 50.
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CHAPTER 1. THE OIL INDUSTRY OF IRAQ 
PAST AND PRESENT
Growth of the Oil Industry
Coal used to be the main driving power for the mach­
ines of the industrial revolution, but the operation of 
these machines required lubricants, the demand for which 
increased with the increasing use of new and more developed 
machines, and with the spread of the mechanical mode of 
transportation.
Until the mid-nineteenth century, the lubricants used 
were of animal and vegetable origin, such as tallow, lard, 
and castor oil, which proved inadequate for the needs of 
the industrial machines. This need stimulated the search 
for a superior lubricant which was found in the mineral oil.
The increasing demand for lubricants and the expanding need 
by the public for better means of illumination by using kero­
sene initiated the birth of the modern oil industry.
The invention of the internal combustion engine in 
the 1860's created the demand for gasoline. The increasing 
use of diesel engines created a demand for a new oil distillate. 
The low cost of using oil as an energy source stimulated the
6
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conversion from coal to oil products in railways, ships,
electric generating plants, and the manufacturing industries.
The high growth rate for oil in the second half of this 
century was associated with the rapid spread of transportation 
dependent on liquid fuels, the advent of the jet age, the 
penetration of industrial and space heating markets and 
the domination of the chemical industry.
The expanding utilization of petroleum brought about 
the gigantic increase in crude oil production from 7 million 
barrels in 1872 to 77 million barrels in 1890, 766 million 
barrels in 1921, 3,687 million barrels in 1950, 7663 million 
barrels in 1960 (Issawi and Yeganeh, 1962, p. 4), and 16,425
million barrels in 1970 (OPEC, 1970, p. 2). This develop­
ment involved the emergence of the Middle East countries 
(together with North and West Africa) as the world's major 
suppliers. The output from the Middle East rose by eleven 
times from 1.8 million barrels/day in 1950 to 19.7 million 
barrels/day in 1975 (Petroleum Economist, June 1976, p. 242).
(See Table 1).
The Oil Industry in Iraq
Oil was discovered in Iraq in 1927 in the Kirkuk area, 
two years after granting the concession to the Iraqi Petro­
leum Company (I.P.C.) in 1925. A new concessionary agree­
ment was signed in 1931 in which IPC acquired rights over 
35,126 square miles.
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In 1932, the British Oil Development Company Ltd. ac­
quired rights over 41,302 square miles. This company was 
taken over by I.P.C. in 1936 and became Mosul Petroleum 
Company (M.P.C.). Oil was discovered by this company at 
Ain Zalah in 1939, but the field was not developed until 
1952.
In 1938, another concession was granted to Basrah 
Petroleum Company (B.P.C.), another subsidiary of I.P.C., 
and this company acquired rights over 87,236 square miles. 
There was little activity in this area during the war, but 
in 1949 the company discovered Zubair oil. fields from which 
oil started flowing in 1951 (Longrigg, 1958, p. 66-83).
With these three concessions, I.P.C. and its affili­
ates controlled virtually all the area of Iraq. With rela­
tively little exploration and drilling, these companies 
made their oil discoveries first north of Iraq, Kirkuk, and 
Ain Zalah, and then south of Iraq, in the Zubair oil field. 
They concentrated their efforts almost exclusively on the 
development of these huge fields, leaving other parts of 
Iraq unexplored and some of the discovered reserves un­
exploited.
In July 1934, the export of Iraqi crude oil commenced 
when the first oil pipeline (12 inch diameter) was completed 
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Sea. Another pipeline (16 inch diameter) was completed 
between these two cities in 1949. In 1951 a pipeline was 
completed between Zubair and Fao on the Arabian Gulf, and 
the export of crude oil of the south was started for the 
first time. In 1952, crude oil of Kirkuk was exported for 
the first time from Banias in Syria on the Mediterranean 
Sea after the completion of a 30-inch diameter pipeline 
between these two cities. In 1961, another 30-inch diameter 
pipeline was completed between Kirkuk and Tripoli on the 
Mediterranean (INOC, 1973, p. 9).
The concessions provided for a fixed royalty of 4 schil­
lings gold per ton (approximately 12.5 percent of the value 
of a ton of crude oil in 1925). The royalty was raised and 
reached its ceiling of 6 schillings per ton in 1950. The 
profit sharing agreement (50 percent) was adopted for the 
first time in Iraq in 1952 (Sayegh, K.S., 1968, p. 45).
After the revolution in 1958, the Iraqi government 
started negotiations with the oil companies to resolve many 
outstanding issues, the most crucial one being the relin­
quishment by the companies of the areas covered by conces­
sions except those being actually exploited. The Iraqi ‘ 
government looked at this issue as an abuse of the right of 
concessions since the companies retained vast areas, all 
of oil potential, and leaving them either unexplored or 
unutilized.
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Since no agreement was reached after 3 years of nego­
tiations, the government promulgated in 1961, Law No. 80, 
appropriating 99 percent of the I.P.C. concession territories, 
and confining the exploratory operations of the IPC and its 
affiliates to the areas it was then exploiting.
The Iraqi National Oil Company
In 1964 the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC) was es­
tablished to engage inside and outside Iraq in the various 
phases of petroleum industry. In 1967 INOC was assigned 
most of Iraq's territory including territorial waters, the 
Continental Shelf and the Iraqi interests in the Neutral 
Zone.
In 1968 and onwards, INOC started exploratory activities, 
drilling,and production, either through service contracts or 
through direct exploitation in all the areas assigned to it.
Nationalization of the Foreign Oil Companies
In 1972 and in settlement to the dispute on outstanding 
issues such as stagnation of production, investment policy, 
and the royalty expensing issue, which could not be solved 
by negotiations, the operations of IPC in Iraq were nationalized 
and were taken over by the Iraqi Company for Oil Operations 
(ICOO) which was established immediately after nationalization.
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In 1973, during the Arab Israeli war, the government 
nationalized the shares of Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon) 
and Mobil Oil Corporation, the share of the Royal Dutch 
Company, and the interests of Partex, owned by Gulbenkian 
Foundation in Basrah Petroleum Company, leaving the British 
and the French as the only foreign producers in the country. 
These last shares were nationalized in 1975 and thus the 
entire petroleum industry came under the control of the 
State of Iraq with the operations of B.P.C. entrusted to 
the Iraqi National Oil Company.
T-1885
CHAPTER 2. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IRAQI 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
Most of the information of this chapter is based on 
the book, "The Economics of Middle Eastern Oil," by Issawi 
and Yeganeh. Other sources are clearly indicated within 
the text of this chapter.
General Characteristics of the Petroleum Industry
The petroleum industry is characterized, in general, 
by the following three main features: economies of scale,
high initial cost, and a high fixed cost to total cost ratio.
These are typical characteristics of the petroleum industry 
and are applicable to the petroleum industry of the Middle 
East, except that due to the huge sizes of the petroleum 
reservoirs in the Middle East, the third feature is not 
applicable.
Economies of Scale. This feature is quite important 
in all the stages of this industry. In the exploration, 
development, and production stages, large scale operations 
increase the probability of finding oil, provide more ad­
vanced scientific and technological means and allow more 
efficient exploitation of the oil fields.
14
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In refining, investment per unit of capacity falls 
sharply with the increase of output. In the United States, 
it was estimated that in 1950, investment per barrel fell 
from $1,300 for a 10,000 b/d refinery to $833 for a 30,000 
b/d refinery, $610 for a 100,000 b/d refinery, and $545 for 
a 200,000 b/d refinery. In Western Europe, it was estimated 
in 1960 that investment per barrel of capacity fell from 
$1,460 for a 10,000 b/d to $600 for a 100,000 b/d refinery.
In transport, both tanker and pipeline reflect high 
economies of scale. For tankers, it was estimated that the 
saving in transport cost per ton of oil, as compared with a 
16,600-ton tanker, was 40 percent for a 45,000-ton tanker,
50 percent for an 85,000-ton tanker, and 60 percent for a 
100,000-ton tanker.
For pipelines, increasing the diameter results in much 
larger proportionate increase in volume and a sharp decline 
in transport unit cost. A 24-inch diameter pipeline can 
carry 30 times as much oil as a 6-inch diameter pipeline.
In Western Europe in 1960, it was estimated that, as compared 
with a'1,000,000 ton throughput pipeline working at full 
capacity, the saving per ton-mile was about 75 percent for 
a 6,000,000 ton pipeline and about 85 percent for a 20,000,000 
ton pipeline.
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High Initial Cost: The petroleum industry, especially
during the production stage, requires vast amounts of invest­
ment before oil starts flowing. This is particularly due to 
economies of scale, the capital intensive nature of this 
industry, and to the high risks and losses encountered in 
the exploration stage.
In exploration, millions of dollars must be spent, and 
in many cases lost, before oil is found. Tens or even hun­
dreds of millions of dollars are required in the development 
stage, building of refineries, pipelines, and tankers. Of 
course, the costs are continually rising in all respects, 
all over the world, due to inflationary tendencies.
In the Middle East, the share of investment in the oil 
industry was small compared with other parts of the oil 
producing regions. Yet, the value of gross fixed assets, 
at historical cost, increased from the equivalent of $100 
million in 1926 to $350 million in 1935, $900 million in 
1947, and $4,125 million in 1960. The net fixed assets were 
$525 million in 1947 and $2,375 million in 1960 (Issawi and 
Yeganeh, 1962, p. 42).
High Fixed Cost. Due largely to high initial investment 
and economies of scale, the fixed costs constitute the large 
part of the total cost while the variable costs constitute 
the small part of it in the petroleum industry, and this is 
true for production, refining, and transportation.
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As mentioned before, vast amounts are invested before 
production of crude oil begins, and during the production 
stage, the variable costs are usually low. It was estimated 
that the cost of lifting oil in the United States averaged 
13C a barrel in 1940, 31C in 1950, and 45C in 1956, while 
the cost of discovery and development was 43C, 92C, and 
$1.42, respectively.
For refining, although fixed costs tend to decline with 
the increase in output, yet, initial investment is very high 
per unit of output compared to labor cost. According to a 
study made in the 1950's, fixed costs accounted for 73 percent 
and variable costs accounted for 27 percent of the total 
costs in 10,000-20,000 b/d refineries working at full capa­
city in the United States (Issawi and Yeganeh, 1962, p. 86).
In pipelines, the bulk of investment is incurred in 
the installation while operating costs are very low. In 
the United States, fixed costs have been estimated at 65 
percent of the total costs for crude pipelines and at 75 
percent for products pipelines.
Middle Eastern Oil Industry
In the Middle East, economies of scale are substantial, 
and despite the low finding cost, large outlays on develop­
ment have been necessary. However, due to the nature of 
the huge reserves discovered in the Middle East, and the 
very low cost of production, initial capital investment
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per unit of reserve has generally been very small, and 
consequently, the fixed costs formed the smaller part in 
crude oil production while the variable costs formed the 
larger part of it.
The Case of Iraq
The oil industry in Iraq has been characterized by 
the same features applicable to the other producing regions 
in the Middle East. Its main features are the following:
A. Economies of Scale. This is a typical feature of 
the oil industry anywhere in the world and it has been true 
in Iraq. This is indicated by the decline in the unit cost 
of production. The cost of crude oil production per barrel 
fell from 45C to 20C between 1949 and 1955-56 as output rose 
from 31 million barrels a year to 242 million barrels a year. 
Also, this feature has been reflected by the agreement be­
tween Iraq and the I.P.C. group in 1952. The cost per ton 
was put at 23s. for 1951, about 17s.6d. for 1952, and about 
13s. for subsequent years, thus reflecting declining produc­
tion costs as the capacity of the oil producing equipment 
and pipelines approach full utilization.
B. Low Finding Cost. Due to the nature of the geolo­
gical formations in Iraq, exploration has been relatively 
easy, the discovery of petroleum has been an almost sure
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event, and consequently, the risks and outlays involved 
in this stage were minimum.
It did not take the I.P.C. more than two years, after 
obtaining its concession in 1925, to make the discovery of 
the famous oil field near Kirkuk. Statistics have shown 
that the average cost of finding a barrel of oil in the 
Middle East, which is a representative of the finding cost 
in Iraq, is two cents compared to a higher cost in other 
parts of the world, reaching 75 cents in the United States 
(Shareef, 1973, p. 2).
C. High Development Cost. This is particularly true
in all the oil producing regions of the developing countries, 
and Iraq is one of them.
This was mainly due to the fact that all the necessary 
materials and equipment and most of the specialized and 
skilled personnel had to be imported from abroad. This is on 
the one hand; on the other hand, it was also due to the com­
plete lack of infrastructure which entailed spending huge 
outlays to build it. In Iraq, the total capital expendi­
ture incurred before export began in 1934 amounted to $62 
million; this included the construction of two pipelines 
to the Mediterranean.
D. Large Size of Oil Reserves. The biggest od,l fields
of the world are known to be in the Middle East. And although 
the exact sizes of the reserves of each oil field are not
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released, Iraq is known to contain two great oil fields 
with immense quantities of petroleum, Kirkuk in the north 
and Rumaila in the south.
This feature made investment per barrel in Iraq very 
low and fixed costs in production lower than variable costs, 
contrary to other oil producing regions outside the Middle 
East.
E. High Productivity of Oil Wells. The productivity 
of the Iraqi oil wells is very high compared to other re­
gions outside the Middle East. While the average productivity 
of the single well per day is 12 barrels in the United States, 
80 barrels in the Soviet Union, 300 barrels in Venezuela,
5.000 barrels in the Arab World; in Iraq, it reaches about
14.000 barrels per day (Shareef, 1973, p. 3). See Table 2.
F. Low Costs of Production. The average cost of pro­
duction per barrel of oil in Iraq, as in any other oil pro­
ducing country in the Middle East, is very low indeed compared 
with other producing regions of the world.
In the 1952 agreement between the Iraqi government and 
the I.P.C. group, it was estimated that actual costs which 
were defined as
"operating expenses and overhead and depreciation 
of all physical assets in Iraq at the rate of ten 
per centum per annum and amortization of all other 
capital expenditure in Iraq at the rate of five per 
centum per annum until such assets and expenditures 
are fully written off."
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were 23 s. per ton for 1951, 17s.6d. for 1952 and 13s. 
thereafter, or about 42C, 33C, and 24C a barrel respectively 
(Issawi and Yeganeh, 1962, p. 91).
A more recent estimate shows that, while the average 
production cost in Iraq was 4C per barrel for the period 
1962-1964, it was 62C for the same period in Venezuela and 
151C in the United States for the period 1961-1962 (INOC, 
1973, p. 10). (See Table 3).
The reason for this low cost of production has been 
due to the economies of scale in production which have al­
ready been mentioned above, the nature of geological for­
mations and the favorable terms of concession agreements.
G. Nature of Geological Formations. As mentioned above, 
Iraq contains two of the world's largest oil fields, Kirkuk 
and Rumaila. Generally, the oil fields in Iraq, as in other 
areas of the Middle East, did not require deep drilling, and 
unlike most oil fields in the world, which use mechanical 
means for oil production, Iraqi oil fields produce under 
their own gas pressure, and have a porosity which permits 
very high productivity per well.
Perhaps the words of Longrigg (1958, p. 71), in his 
historical description of the discovery of Kirkuk can give 
a picture of the nature of oil fields in Iraq:
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Source: INOC, 1973, Oil in Iraq; Baghdad, INOC 
Publications, p. 10.
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"The well spudded in at Baba Gurgur, immediately 
north’ of Kirkuk, on 2 7 June 1927, was in contrast 
to all these disappointments destined profoundly 
to alter both the economic fortunes of Iraq and 
the oil history of the world. The strike at Baba 
No. 1 on 15 October, when the oil by the violence 
of its force broke all control, flowed ‘wild1 for 
a week, and cost the lives of two drillers, indi­
cated an oil field so important as to lead the 
Turkish Petroleum Company, a few months later, to 
abandon for some years all operations in other areas."
H. Favorable Terms of Concessions. The concession 
areas in the Middle East have been very large. The con­
cession obtained by the I.P.C. group covered the entire 
area of Iraq, until 1961 when the government of Iraq pro­
mulgated Law No. 80 appropriating 99 percent of the conces­
sionary area.
This fact has lowered production cost in Iraq by pre­
venting competitive drilling and the sinking of unnecessary 
wells. Consequently, this made substantial savings in capital 
cost due to optimum well drilling, and the prevention of loss 
in gas pressure and ultimate recovery which might have re­
sulted from excessive drilling.
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CHAPTER 3. PETROLEUM RESERVES OF IRAQ
Crude Oil Reserves
The Arab Petroleum Guide (1974-1975, p. 21), published 
the Iraqi crude oil reserves as being 31.5 billion barrels, 
putting the country fourth in the rank of Middle Eastern 
oil producing countries coming after Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
and Iran, and eighth in the rank of world oil producing 
countries with respect to oil reserves (see Table 4).
The Annual Supplement to the Quarterly Economic Review, 
(IRAQ, 1976, p. 11) stated that the proved oil reserves of 
Iraq are estimated at 35 billion barrels and Iraq is cur­
rently ranked seventh in the world league table of oil 
producers.
The difference of 3.5 billion barrels between the 
estimates of 1974 and 1976 is not due to new additions in 
proved reserves, since little exploration has been carried 
out since 1961 and although INOC started an active explora­
tion program since the beginning of this decade, but it is 
due, rather, to the uncertainty of the oil reserves.
Official figures concerning actual petroleum reserves are
25
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Crude Oil Reserves in the Middle East 
Early 1974
Oil Reserves 













Bahrain and Dubai 4,813
Source: ' Loutfy, A., and Shawkat, M.M., 1975, 
Demand on Energy Sources Particularly 
Oil, in Oil and Raw Materials, Baghdad 
Second International Seminar, p. 47.
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not usually released, but Iraqi officials estimate the 
proved reserves to be much higher than 35 billion barrels, 
and the figure to be more .suited to the actual Iraqi proved 
reserves would be around 60 billion barrels. However,
35 billion barrels will be used for the purpose of this 
study.
Reserve Depletion
In order to assess the sufficiency of the oil reserves 
until the time they are depleted a number of assumptions 
will be made concerning the size of the reserves, explora­
tory activities, and growth in production.
For the sake of the following computations, it is assumed 
that the reserves are 35 billion barrels and there are no 
new additions to the reserves. Of course, INOC is under­
taking an extensive exploratory program throughout the coun­
try, but since any information of new discoveries is not 
released, the reserves that are promoted by such discoveries 
are not known and will not be taken in consideration.
Case A. The current oil production in Iraq has been 
182.2 million barrels for Jan., Feb., and March 1976 (The 
Pet. Economist, June, 1976, p. 242). If such trend * in 
^production is kept throughout the rest of the year, the 
total production in 1976 will be about 729 million barrels, 
which is 2 million barrels a day. As for future production,
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it is forecasted that it will reach 4 million barrels daily 
by 1980 (Q.E.R., Annual Supplement, Iraq, 1976, p. 11). 
However, this seems to be a rapid development in production 
which is not justified by market demand. A more reasonable 
trend is to follow the rates of growth of world demand on 
oil, and if no new sources of crude oil are developed in 
other parts of the world, within.the projected period, then 
it can be reasonably assumed that oil production in the 
country will follow the trend of growth of world demand on 
oil which is shown in Table 5.
TABLE 5
Growth Rates of World Demand on Oil





Source: Loutfi, A., and Shawkat, M.M., 1975, Demand on 
Energy Sources Particularly Oil, in Oil and Raw 
Materials, Baghdad Second International Seminar, 
p. 45.
Thus, the growth rate of production will be considered 
as 5.9 percent for 1976-1980, 4.8 percent for 1981-1.985, and
4.1 percent for 1986-1990. According to these rates, produc­
tion will reach 917 million barrels in 1980,1,159 million 
barrels in 1985, and 1,417 million barrels in 1990, while
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the reserves' for the same years will be 31,627, 26,339, and 
19,791 million barrels, respectively.
According to Table 6 and Figure 3, in 1990 the reserves 
will be sufficient for another 14 years only if crude oil 
production is kept at 1,417 million barrels annually, equiva­
lent to 3.88 million barrels daily, which is the expected 
production in the year 1990.
Case B. Iraq is, at the present time, carrying out an 
extensive program in expanding oil production facilities, 
pipelines, and export terminals in order to raise its export 
capacity to more than 4 million barrels daily by 1980.
If the forecast is fulfilled, that is, raising crude 
oil production to 4 million barrels daily by 1980, this will 
mean that the average annual growth rate of production will 
be 18.9 percent starting from the beginning of 1977. This 
is certainly a high rate of growth.
The average annual growth rate of production for the 
period 1961-1971 has been 5.4 percent. This certainly has 
been very low compared with the average growth rate of pro­
duction in the neighboring countries of the Middle East, 
or with the average growth rate of world demand on oil. •
This low rate has been due to the policy of "punishment" 
which was pursued by the oil companies after the promulga­
tion of Law No. 80 and the appropriation of 99 percent of 
the concession areas of Iraq.
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TABLE 6
Expected Annual Oil Production and Reserve Depletion for
1976-90 (Case A)
Production Annual No. of Yrs.
Growth Rate Production Reserve Before
Year (%)______  (Mil, barrels) (Mil. barrels) Depletion
1976 — 729 35,000 48
1977 5.9 772 34,228 44
1978 5.9 818 33,410 41
1979 5.9 866 32,544 38
1980 5.9 917 31,627 35
1981 4.8 961 30,666 32
1982 4.8 1,007 29,659 29
1983 4.8 1,055 28,604 27
1984 4.8 1,106 27,498 25
1985 4.8 1,159 26,339 23
1986 4.1 1,207 25,132 21
1987 4.1 1,256 23,876 19
1988 4.1 1,307 22,569 17
1989 4.1 1,361 21,208 16
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The average annual growth rate of production for the 
period 1972-1975 has been 16.2 percent. This was the period 
of nationalization of the oil operations in Iraq. This very 
high rate of growth reflects the desire of Iraq to adjust 
the low trend of growth which dominated the past decade on 
the one hand, and to bring crude oil production to a level 
that is compatible with the ambitious economic development 
plans on the other hand.
The following analysis assumes that Iraq is going to 
increase production to 4 million barrels daily by 1980, 
which means an annual growth rate of 18.9 percent for the 
period 1977-1980, that the increase in the Iraqi output 
will be accomodated by world oil market, and that Iraq will 
revert to the normal growth rates of 4.8 percent for the 
period 1981-1985, and 4.1 percent for the period 1986-1990.
Table 7 shows that in 1980, if production is maintained 
at 1,457 million barrels annually or 4 million barrels 
daily with no growth in production in the subsequent years, 
the reserves will be depleted in the turn of this century.
If the growth rate of production is slowed down from 18.9 
percent to 4.8 percent for the period 198.1-1985, and to 4.1 
percent for the period 1986-1990, then the reserves will 
be depleted in 1995. In Figure 4, the steeply declining 
curve between 1976 and 1980 shows how rapid the reserves 
are depleted in this period and if such trend continues, 
the reserves will be depleted sometime in the late 1980's.
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TABLE 7
Expected Annual Oil Production 
and Reserve Depletion for 1976-1990 (Case B)
Production Annual
Growth Rate Production
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Since the Iraqi production plans are not commensurate 
with the published reserves, as the above analysis shows, 
either of the following interpretations can probably justify 
such plans. First, the actual proved recoverable reserves 
could be much higher than 35 billion barrels and there has 
been some speculation concerning this issue.
Auldridge (1975, p. 21) stated that the country has an 
estimated 35 billion barrels of oil reserves, but govern­
ment officials insist that Iraq's crude reserves are "at 
least" 75 billion barrels. Second, 35 billion barrels could
be a true representative of the Iraqi reserves at the present
time, but it is believed that huge amounts of additional 
reserves are sure to be discovered. The Petroleum Economist, 
(August 1975, p. 299) , stated that,
"However, unlike most other Middle Eastern 
countries whose oil potential is known within 
reasonable accuracy, Iraq still has areas which
have not yet been thoroughly explored and the
possibility, according to Iraqi officials, of 
at least doubling its reserves, to place them 
perhaps second only to Saudi Arabia,"
and also stated that in order to assess the extent of its
oil reserves, Iraq is giving top priority to exploration,
on which $1.5 billion is to be spent in the course of a
D
five-year program starting from 1974.
However, if 35 billion barrels are the only reserves 
that Iraq will possess, it would be irrational, indeed, for
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Iraq to fo,llow such an extravagant course of oil production. 
According to Table 7, production has to be reduced drasti­
cally in the 1980's and crude oil export halted completely 
early in the 1990's, if there is going to be any saving 
in petroleum in order to satisfy the country's demand for 
energy, and to feed the petrochemical industry which is 
expected to be a dominant one at that time.
Natural Gas Reserves and Production
The estimated proved natural gas reserves in Iraq 
are 62,000 billion SCF and the probable reserves are 31,000 
billion SCF (Arab Petroleum Guide, 1974-1975, p. 35).
Most of the associated gas is flared, while a very 
small proportion of it is used as a source of energy and a 
feed-stock to the tiny petrochemical industry in Iraq, and 
nothing is exported. It is estimated that in 1969 alone, 
the amount flared by the oil.companies was 200 billion SCF, 
and that the amount available for exploitation at the present 
time is 207 billion SCF a year (Ministry of Oil, Iraq, 1973, 
p. 63).
INOC decided to exploit this vital source of energy 
and raw material. The subject of exploitation of the natural 
gas will be referred to at a later stage in this study.
Table 8 shows the amounts of natural gas produced, consumed, 
and flared in this country for the period 1965-1974.
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TABLE 8
Production of Natural Gas and Quantities Consumed 
and Burned by Oil Companies 
(millions of .Standard Cubic Feet)
Quantity Percent Quantity
Year Production Consumed Consumed Burned
1965 194,764 17,500 9.0 177,214
1966 218,675 19,174 8.8 199,501
1967 200,100 16,382 8.2 183,718
1968 177,460 17,122 9.6 160,338
1969 217,599 26,926 12.4 190,673
1970 216,490 27,673 12.8 188,817
1971 282,873 32,676 11.6 250,197
1972* 262,000 33,000 12.6 229,000
1973* 308,253 42,730 13.9 265,523
1974* 328,963 41,024 12.5 285,678
* Excluding INOC.
Source: Central Statistical Organization, 1975, 
Annual Abstract, 1974, p. 193.
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CHAPTER 4. CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION,
CONSUMPTION, AND EXPORT
Crude Oil Production
Production of crude oil in Iraq started in 1934. The
amount produced in 1934 was 7 ,335 thousand barrels and in
1935 rose to 27,294 thousand barrels (Ministry of Oil, Oil 
and Minerals in Iraq, 1973, p. 39). Table 9 shows annual 
production of crude oil in Iraq since 1938.
The growth in Production of crude oil in Iraq has been
very low, compared with Iraq's capacity to produce oil, or
with the growth rate in the other producing countries of 
the Middle East. There was no growth in production for the 
period 1938-194 9. The oil companies concentrated their 
efforts on the other producing countries of the Middle East, 
especially neighboring Saudi Arabia and Iran. Production 
in Iran rose from 10.19 million long tons in 1938 to 26.81 
million long tons in 1949/ while production in Saudi Arabia 
rose from 0.53 million long tons in 1939 to 23.1 million long 




Production of Crude Oil in Iraq 
(thousand barrels)















1973 - 2,018.0 736,588
1?74 1,976.0 719,275
1975 2,248.3 820,630
♦Including production of I jC.O.O. and I.N.O.C. beginning 
1972.
Source: Central Statistical Organization, Statistical
Pocketbook, 1974, p. 63, for the period 1938-1973, 
and Annual Abstract of Statistics, 197 4, p. 193, 
for 1974. Petroleum Economist, June 1976, p. 242 
for the production of 1975.
ARTHUR LAKES LIBMRY, 
COLORADO SCHOOLol MNES
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In the 1950's, a great development program was followed 
by the oil companies and the growth rate in production was 
a good 11.1 percent until 1961. The reason for such develop­
ment and growth was due to some important events that occurred 
in the Middle East, the most important one was the nationali­
zation of oil in Iran in 1951. In 1952 alone, production in 
Iraq rose by 115.8 percent from 8.55 million long tons in 
1951 to 18.45 million long tons in 1952.
In the 1960's the growth in production stagnated from
11.1 percent to 5.2 percent especially after the promulgation 
of Law No. 80. This low rate neither was consistent with 
the capacity of the oil fields, and the installations in Iraq, 
nor with the growth of production of the other producing 
countries in the Middle East, nor with the growth of world 
oil consumption which was 7.5 percent for that period. See 
Table 10 and Figure 5.
TABLE 10
Average Annual Growth of Production 
of the Middle Eastern Countries 
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Between 1972 and 1975, the oil operations were na­
tionalized in Iraq, and growth rate of production jumped 
to an annual average of 16.2 percent and it is expected to 
rise to 18'. 9 percent between 1976 and 1980, since Iraq plans 
to raise production to 4 million barrels daily by 1980.
Crude Oil Consumption
The data for crude oil supplied to Iraqi refineries was 
supplied by the Economic Dept., Ministry of Oil, Iraq. These 
data represent crude oil consumed in Iraq since negligible 
quantities of refined products are exported (see Table 11).
The data in Table 11 were run through the computer using 
(LESQ program of the Pet. Eng. Dept., Colorado School of Mines), 
and the following predicting equation for the behavior of 
domestic consumption was found:
Y = 20,007 + 893.17X + 113.84X2 
where Y represents consumption in thousands of barrels and 
X represents number of years starting from 1964 as year 0.
According to this equation, consumption will be 63,440 
thousand barrels in 1980, 88,967 thousand barrels in 1985, 
and 120,185 thousand barrels in 1990. Figure 6 shows actual 
consumption for the period 1964-74 and the trend until 1985.
The annual growth rate of domestic consumption was 6.2 
percent for the period 1964-70 and 8.5 percent for the period 
1970-74. It is expected that, according to this equation,
T-1885 43
TABLE 11















(2) Excluding Basrah refinery which started 
in 1974.
Source: Economic Department, Ministry of Oil,
July 1976, "written communication."
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the annual growth rate will be 8.1 percent for 1974-80,
7.0 percent for 1980-85, and 6.2 percent for 1985-90.
For the period between 1964 and 1970 the growth rate 
of oil consumption was low compared with the average growth 
of world demand on oil which was 7.7 percent. This low rate 
was due to the low rate of growth which characterized the 
Iraqi economy in the 1960's. For the periods 1970-74,
1974-80, and 1980-85, the rates of growth of oil consumption 
are higher than the corresponding rates of growth of world 
demand on oil (see Table 5). This will be due to the ex­
pected higher growth rates in the Iraqi economy.
Indeed, higher growth rates than the average of world 
oil consumption are to be expected, since per capita energy 
consumption in Iraq is very low compared with the world 
average. Higher growth rates of oil consumption represent 
higher growth rates of energy consumption, since oil is 
the main source of energy in Iraq, and this, in turn, re­
flects higher growth rates in the economy in general.
Table 12 shows the per capita energy consumption in 
Iraq, In equivalent kilograms of coal, compared with other 
parts of the world. The per capita consumption of Iraq in 
1970 was about one-third that of the world. This table also 
shows that per capita energy consumption in the United States 
was about six times that of the world in 1970, and in the
T-1885 46
TABLE 12
Average Per Capita Energy Consumption 







Kingdom U.S A. World
1961 505 323 248 377 4,903 8,068 1,387
1962 511 338 276 417 4,931 8,288 1,433
1963 580 336 287 431 5,111 8,628 1,499
1964 593 379 316 437 - 5,097 8,927 1,550
1965 513 389 366 480 5,122 9,219 1,592
1966 560 410 415 508 5,088 9,640 1,649
1967 573 440 455 537 4,893 9,881 1,648
1968 620 486 625 585 4,961 10,398 1,734
1969 629 538 695 625 5,139 10,824 1,811
1970 617 887 827 738 5,358 11,128 1,897
Source: United Nations, World Energy Supplies,1961-1970, 
1972, p. 6-53.
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United Kingdom about three times that of the world in the 
same year.
Crude Oil Exports
Iraqi crude oil is exported to various countries all 
over the world. The principal importers are the European 
Economic Community (E.E.C.), especially Italy and France. 
Table 13 shows crude oil exports for the period 1970-74.
TABLE 13
Exports of Crude Oil 







Source: Central Statistical Organization, Annual Abstract 
of Statistics 1974, p. 194.
The future ability of Iraq to export oil depends, to a 
far extent, on the future world demand on oil and the mode 
of energy consumption balance. The consumption of world 
oil is expected to increase in absolute quantity, but the 
share of it in world energy consumption is expected to de­
crease due to the development of alternative sources of 
energy, especially nuclear.
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In 1970, the world energy consumption was the equiva­
lent of 99 million barrels of oil daily, about half of it 
was supplied by oil. The average annual growth of energy 
consumption was about 6 percent since the second world war, 
and it is expected to drop to 5.8 percent for the period
1975-85. Accordingly, world energy requirement will be the 
equivalent of 170 million barrels daily in 1980, and 220 
million barrels daily in 1985 and it is expected that world 
oil consumption will reach 90 million barrels daily in 1980, 
and 111 million barrels daily in 1985 (Arab Petroleum Guide, 
1974-1975, p. 338).
The proved world oil reserves in 1974 were 62 8 billion 
barrels (Loutfi, A., and Shawkat, M.M., 1975, p. 46), while 
the average yearly addition to these reserves, due to new 
discoveries, has been 18 billion barrels since 1948. It 
is expected that the average yearly consumption will be 21 
billion barrels, and if it is assumed that the rate of dis­
covery of proved reserves will remain 18 billion barrels 
for the future, then the annual shortage in crude oil supply 
will be 3 billion barrels, and the world oil reserves will 
be depleted in 209 years. However, if the reserves are not 
promoted by new discoveries in the future, the world oil 
reserves will be depleted in about 30 years (Arab Petroleum 
Guide, 1974-1975, p. 338).
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\ Based on the above assumptions and analysis, crude 
oil is still expected to play a significant role in the 
world energy consumption balance until at least the year 
2000 and Iraq will be able to export all the quantities it 
is planning to export, which are expected to be commensurate 
with its economic development plans.
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CHAPTER 5. OIL REVENUES AND RETAINED VALUE
Indicators of Economic Impact
In discussing the effects and contributions of a re­
source industry to the economy of a host country, Mikesell 
(1973, p. 23) pointed to the following four indicators:
(1) the net foreign exchange contribution; (2) the resource 
availability effect; (3) the direct domestic input effect; 
and (4) the indirect factor mobilization inducement and 
productivity effect. Indicators (1) and (2) seem to overlap 
each other to a far extent, while indicator (3) seems to be 
included in (1) as the following equation shows:
Res = W + Lp + Ta + Tr 
where ReS is the net foreign exchange effect or "retained 
value"; W is wages (less remittances abroad of nonnationals); 
Lp is local purchases of nonfactor inputs; Ta is tax payments 
to the government; and Tr represents other transfers. The 
direct domestic input effect is W + Lp.
Mamalakis (1973, p. 392),in discussing the contribution 
of copper to Chilean economic development, was more clear 
than Mikesell in specifying the effects of a resource in­
dustry. He pointed out the following three indicators:
50
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(1) the resource availability effect which relates to the 
supply of resources made available to the economy and in­
cludes the foreign exchange contribution, the government 
revenue contribution, the capital inflow contribution, and 
the capital goods contribution; (2) the profitability effect 
which constitutes the increased demand for output and the 
increase in investment in other sectors; and (3) the factor 
employment effect.
The above indicators are not presented in the same 
sequence as shown above, but are discussed at various places 
in this study. Foreign exchange and oil revenues are dis­
cussed in this chapter, while capital inflow and capital 
goods contribution are discussed in the chapters treating 
capital formation and economic development plans, respec­
tively. The profitability effect is discussed in the chapter 
treating "linkages". The labor employment contribution is 
discussed in the chapter treating employment in the oil 
industry.
Oil Revenues
It seems that published figures about the oil revenues 
of the oil producing countries vary from source to source. 
Some sources estimate oil revenues on the basis of oil 
exported and the current prices in that year. Other sources
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depend on government reports which reflect revenues re­
ceived within the accounting periods. Sometimes such dif­
ferences are accounted for by retrospective claims, leads, 
and lags in payment dates, and the confusion between calendar 
and fiscal years (Fallon, 1975, p. 44);
Table 14 shows the oil revenues received by Iraq for 
the period 1965-74. This table shows a steady increase in 
revenues except for 1967 when oil export ceased through the 
Mediterranean that year due to differences between the 
Syrian government and the oil companies; and also for 1972 
when oil production was drastically reduced as a result of 
pressure exerted on the Iraqi government by the oil companies 
which ended in the nationalization of IPC.
The prices per barrel of Iraqi oil were $0.82 in 1965, 
$0.96 in 1970, $2.27 in 1973, and $10.60 in 1974 (Fallon, 
1975, p. 45). The high prices in 1973 and 1974 account for 
the steep rise in revenues in those two years. Production 
in 1973 was 1.31 times that of 1970, and in 1974 it was 
1.27 times that of 1970, while the revenues rose by 3.1 
times and 13.6 times in 1973 and 1974, respectively.
The financial losses resulted to the country from 
stagnation in production for the period 1962-1970 were esti­
mated at $1,540 million compared with the situation had the 
production in Iraq increased at the same annual growth rate
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TABLE 14














Source: Ministry of Oil, Economic Dept., Iraq,
1974, Oil and Development, p. 9, for 
the period 1965-72, and Fallon, N.,
1975, Middle East Oil Money and its 
Future Expenditure, p. 45, for the 
period 1973-74.
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of 11 percent, a rate common to the other producing coun­
tries in the Middle East (Ministry of Oil, 1973b, p. 8).
Using the implicit price deflator of the crude oil 
sector in the Iraqi GNP, crude oil revenues at constant 
prices of 1969 are shown in Table 15 for the period 1969-74. 
Except for the sharp increase in prices in 1973 and 1974, 
it is expected that prices will keep steady unless adjusted 
upwards, between now and then, in order to protect OPEC's 
terms of trade and to maintain the value of oil prices in 
real terms. Hence, oil revenues, at constant prices, which 
are expected to accrue to Iraq in the future, will be pro­
portionate to the amounts of crude oil exported.
TABLE 15
Oil Revenues of Iraq 
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Retained Value
The retained value or net foreign exchange effect is, 
as defined above, equal to local wages, and purchases of 
non factor inputs plus tax payments and other transfers.
Table 16 is extracted from an analytic presentation for 
Iraqi balance of payments, published in the Iraqi Central 
Bank Bulletin, 1975. The amounts shown are in Iraqi Dinars. 
The exchange rates for the Iraqi Dinar shown in the Inter­
national Financial Statistics are as follows: I.D.l = $2.8
up to 1971; $3.04 for 1972; and $3.38 for 1973, and upwards.
The export value is shown at the top of the table.
After deducting the value of imports, dividends, and interest 
transferred abroad, employees remittances, and adjusting 
for any capital movements and errors and omissions, retained 
value is obtained. It is shown as the sum of Iraqi govern­
ment share of profits, expenditures in Iraq which includes 
wages and local purchases, arid any transfers which are shown 
as net credit from I.P.C. Section B of the table shows ex­
ports of Iraq other than oil.
Table 17 is constructed from Table 16. Column (1) 
shows total value of exports including crude oil and others. 
Column (2) shows the share of oil in total exports. This 
share varies between 91 percent in 1972, when oil produc­
tion was drastically reduced by the oil companies, and 98 
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high. Column (3) shows the total foreign exchange earnings 
of the country. Column (4) shows the share of foreign ex­
change earned by oil; this share varies between 87 percent 
in 1972 and 98 percent in the first half of 1974.
These shares show the economy of the country as an 
export economy. It is dominated by oil for its exports and 
foreign exchange earnings. This fact calls for sound eco­
nomic planning and extensive investment in agriculture, 
other industries, and in human resources, in order to sub­
stitute for the oil effect which is a depletable resource.
Finally, column (5) in Table 17 shows the ratio of re­
tained value or net foreign exchange earned by oil, to the 
total value of oil exports. While it was around 50 percent 
in 1969, 1970, and 1971, it rose to 68 percent in 1972,
85 percent in 1973, and 82 percent in the first half of 
1974. This was due to the nationalization of I.P.C. in 
June, 1972, and part of B.P.C. in October 1973. Consequently, 
less dividends were transferred abroad and almost all the 
rent was captured by the country.
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CHAPTER 6 . SHARE OF THE OIL INDUSTRY IN THE NATIONAL 
INCOME AND CAPITAL FORMATION
Share of the Oil Industry in the National Income
When discussing the share of the oil industry, the 
production side of it is meant only. That is, the crude 
oil industry which is considered as part of the mining and 
quarrying sector in the national accounts; refining and 
petrochemicals are considered as part of the manufacturing 
industries in the national accounts and are not considered 
here in this chapter.
The oil industry in Iraq plays a dominant role in the 
formation of the gross domestic product; it forms about 
one-third of the GDP. This is so, because the role of the 
other sectors in the formation of the GDP is very weak com­
pared with crude oil production.
Table 18 shows the GDP and the share of oil industry 
for the period 1964-71 at constant prices of 1964. Except 
for 1967 when oil production dwindled due to the dispute 
between the oil companies and the Syrian government, and 
the consequent stoppage of oil exports through the Medi­
terranean at the beginning of that year, the oil industry 
kept an average share of 32 percent in the GDP.
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GDP and the Share of Oil Industry for the Period 1964-71 




Year GDP Oil Industry in GDP (%)
1964 793.7 270.9 34
1965 868.0 281.0 32
1966 916.7 298.5 33
1967 903.1 262.7 29
1968 1,023.4 325.6 32
1969 1,053.7 326.6 31
1970 1,097.2 342.5 31
1971 1,162.5 365.1 31
Source: Central Statistical Organization, 1973,
National Income in Iraq for 1964-71, p. 33-34.
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Table 19 shows the GDP and the share of oil industry for 
the period 1969-74 at current prices, while Table 20 shows 
them for the same period at constant prices of 1969. The 
oil industry kept an average share of 30 percent in this 
period at constant prices, except for 1972 when, again, 
crude oil production was reduced drastically as a result 
of pressure from the oil companies on the Iraqi government
As one can see from Tables 18 and 20, although crude 
oil contributes a very important share, indeed it is the 
largest share, this share is being continually reduced.
While it was 34 percent of the GDP in 196.4/ it became 31 
percent in 1970, and 28 percent in 1974. This is so, be­
cause the share of the other sectors in the GDP is increasing. 
Of course, this is a healthy sign, because, although the 
share of the oil industry is increasing in absolute quan­
tity, its ratio is being reduced which means that the Iraqi 
economy is reducing its dependence on crude oil production 
while increasing it on the other sectors of the economy, 
especially the manufacturing industries, electricity and 
water,‘construction, and services. This means that the 
other sectors are growing and the productive base of the 
economy is widening.
Table 21 shows the annual average growth rates for the 
various sectors of the GDP in constant prices of 1969, for 
the periods 1964-74 and 1969-74. The growth rate of the oil
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TABLE 19
GDP and Share of the Oil Industry for the Period 




Year GDP Oil Industry in GDP
1969 1,109.7 335.9 30
1970 1,202.4 362.6 30
1971 1,397.4 504.0 36
1972 1,388.8 400.0 29
1973 1,587.5 563.4 35
1974 3,535.4* 2,123.0 60
* Preliminary figures
Sources: C.S.O., 1974, Statistical pocket book 1974, 
p. 77 for the period 1969-71; and C.S.O., 
1976, p. 10, for the period 1972-74.
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TABLE 20
GDP and the Share of Oil Industry for the Period
1969-74




Year GDP Oil Industry in GDP
1969 1,109.7 335.9 30
1970 1,135.5 342.4(1) 30
1971 1,191.9 377.9 32
1972 1,230.5 326.2 27
1973 1,360.0 448.1 33
1974 1,583.1(2) 438.1 28
(1) Estimated.
(2) Preliminary figures.
Source: Central Statistical Organization, 1976,
The Domestic Product and National Income 
in Iraq for the Years 1964-74, p. 8-12
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TABLE 21
Average Percentage Rates of Growth for the Various 
Sectors of the GDP at Constant Prices
Base Year 1969
Sector Growth Rate Growth Rate
1964-74 1969-74
Agriculture, Forestry, 
and Fishery 4.5 0.8
Crude Oil 4.5 5.6
Other Mining Activities 6.6 5.1
Manufacturing Industries 7.1 8.6
Constructions 6.3 13.6
Electricity and Water 10.2 10.0
Transport, Communication, 
and Storage 2.1 3.3
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade 3.4 4.4
Banking, Insurance, and 
Real Estate Agents 9.2 10.9
Ownership of Dwellings 6.4 3.8
Public Administration 
and Defense 8.3 11.8
Services 8.8 12.6
GDP 5.4 6.8
Source: Central Statistical Organization, 1976;
The Domestic Product and National Income 
of Iraq for the Years 1964-74, p. 15.
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industry for the period 1964-74 has been 4.5 percent, while 
for the period 1969-74, it has been 5.6 percent. These 
rates are lower than the growth rates of the GDP for the 
same periods which were 5.4 percent and 6.8 percent, res­
pectively. These results are justified by the fact that 
most of the other sectors of the GDP have been growing at 
faster rates than the oil industry, the most important of 
which were the manufacturing industries, construction, 
electricity and water, banking and insurance, public 
administration and defense, arid services.
Indeed, the GDP should lean more heavily on agriculture, 
as Iraq is supposed to have an immense wealth of land and 
water, but the rate of growth of agriculture and forestry 
has been disappointing. It has been 0.8 percent for the 
period 1969-74, and 4.5 percent for the period 1964-74.
This poor rate of growth has been due to the fluctuations 
in the amounts of rainfall which characterize the area on 
the one hand, and, unfortunately, for the many complicated 
problems connected with agriculture on the other hand. The 
government should pay more serious attention to this issue 
and apply sound and remedial solutions to the problems facing 
this vital sectors.
Using the computer, arid the data for the GDP in constant 
1969 prices shown in Table 20, the following predicting equa­
tion for the GDP is obtained:
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Y = 1164.9899 - 67.4345X + 22.3196X2 
where Y is GDP in millions of dinars, and X is number of 
years starting from 1968 as year 0. The GDP in 1980 is 
expected to reach 3,569 million dinars, and in 1985 it is 
expected to reach 6,468 million dinars according to this 
equation (see Figure 7). The expected average rates of 
growth for the periods 1974-80 and 1980-85 are 14.5 percent 
and 12.6 percent, respectively. These are high rates of 
growth compared with the growth rates prevailing in the 
periods 1964-74 and 1969-74. However, these growth rates 
can only be true if the share of gross domestic investment 
in the GDP becomes significant.
The ratio of gross domestic investment to the GDP was 
16 percent in 1971 and the GDP increased by 5 percent over 
that of 1970. Data for gross domestic investment beyond 
1971 are not available. However, oil revenues increased 
immensely since 1973 and the Iraqi government started allo­
cating the larger portion of these revenues for domestic 
investment. Therefore, it is expected that since 1973, the 
ratio of gross domestic investment to the GDP has exceeded 
20 percent and will stay that way throughout the rest of 
this decade. In 1973, the increase in the GDP was 10.5 per­
cent over 1972, and the increase in 1974 was 16.4 percent 
over 1973.
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Using the computer and the data for the oil industry 
share in Table 20, the following predicting equation for 
the share of the oil industry is obtained:
Y = 357.3899 - 15.0667X +' 5.0466X2 
where Y is the share of the oil industry in the GDP in 
millions of dinars in 1969 prices, and X is number of years, 
1968 being year 0. In 1980, the-value added by the oil 
industry will be 903 million dinars which will make 25 
percent of the GDP in 1980. This decline in the role of 
the oil industry in the GDP is expected, since, as men­
tioned above, the other sectors of the economy will be 
growing at faster rates than the oil industry.
Share of the Oil Industry in Capital Formation
Capital formation is investment in capital equipment 
such as machines, plants, equipment, and transport facilities 
It is a reasonably good economic indicator, since the size 
of capital formation of any industry indicates the amount 
of future contribution to the national income, and in the 
case of oil production industry, it indicates the size of 
future foreign exchange the country is going to obtain as
Bwell as the size of its contribution to the national* income.
The Early Stages of the Industry. Investment in the 
oil industry of Iraq has been very low, as elsewhere in the 
Middle East, compared to its counterparts in other parts of
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the world. This low capital requirement is essentially 
due to the characteristics of the oil industry of Iraq, 
which have already been discussed at the beginning of this 
study, and most important of which are the high probability 
of discovering petroleum deposits, the exceptionally fa­
vorable geological formations, and the high productivity 
of the Ir^qi oil wells.
The order of magnitude of investment in the Iraqi 
petroleum industry can very well be represented by the 
magnitude of investment in the oil industry of the Middle 
East compared to the rest of the world. In 1960 the Middle 
Eastern petroleum industry represented 68 percent of the ’ 
world's proved oil reserves (excluding the Soviet Bloc),
26 percent of its crude oil production capacity, and 7 
percent of its refining capacity; its share in the total 
fixed assets of the petroleum industry (excluding foreign 
flag tankers) was only 5 percent. In Iraq, the Turkish 
Petroleum (later I.P.C.) obtained its concession in 1925; 
in 1927 it discovered oil; and by 1934 when Iraqi oil 
started flowing to world markets, total capital expenditure 
had reached about $62 million (Issawi and Yeganeh, 1962, p. 48).
Table 22 shows annual investment in Iraq, Iran, and 
Saudi Arabia for the period 1948-58. Iraq's share of in­
vestment was small even when compared with other Middle
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TABLE 22
Annual Gross Fixed Investment and Breakdown 
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Source: Issawi and Yeganeh, 1962, p, 45.
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Eastern oil producing countries. The period of the 1950's 
has been considered as the period during which the most ex­
tensive development occurred that has ever been carried- out 
Iraq by the oil companies. Yet, these investments were 
modest compared with Saudi Arabia for the same period, or 
even with Iran since the Iranian investment was comparable 
with that of Iraq only because of the total absence of in­
vestment in 1952, 1953, and 1954 due to the nationalization
of Iranian oil in 1951. It can be seen from the breakdown
of total investment, that nothing was invested in refining 
activities; the bulk of crude oil was exported and a negli­
gible amount was refined, only for domestic consumption.
This fact has made Iraq, until now, one of the smallest 
refiners in the world, with respect to its crude oil output.
Capital Formation Until 1970. When talking about 
capital formation here, it is meant the part which is
attributed to the I.P.C. group. Gross fixed capital forma­
tion is defined by the oil companies as to comprise annual 
expenditure on the replacement of, and addition and major 
improvements to, fixed capital assets, including the value 
of work-in-progress, within the political boundaries of 
Iraq (Hashim, 1972, p. 1).
The contribution of the oil production industry to 
capital formation in the period 1957-70 is summarized in 
the following three tables. Table 23 shows the gross fixed
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capital formation contributed by the oil production indus­
try for the period 1957-70. This table shows that invest­
ment has been rising until it peaked in 1960, and then 
dwindled after 1961 until it reached its minimum of 0.48 
million dinar in 1970. This steep decline in investment 
was, certainly, a reaction to Law No. 80. promulgated by 
Iraq in 1961.
Table 24 shows the annual gross fixed capital forma­
tion compared with the value added by the oil industry, 
that is, the contribution of the oil industry to the GDP. 
Gross profit forms about 96 percent of the value added 
while wages and salaries form about 4 percent of the value 
added. From this table, it seems that- the gross fixed 
capital formation makes a small percentage of the gross 
profits; the largest being 11 percent in 1960.
Table 25 shows the contribution of the oil industry 
to the total domestic capital formation for the period 
1957-69. In this period, the share of the oil industry 
in making the domestic capital formation of Iraq ranged 
from a maximum of 19 percent in 1960 to a minimum of 0.3 
percent in 1969. Unlike other sectors of the economy, such 
as the manufacturing sector, electricity and water, public 
administration and trade, and" services and ownership 
of dwellings, which have been increasing their share
ARTHUR EAKES EIBKAHU 




Gross Fixed Capital Formation by the Oil Industry 
for the Period 1957-70 
(thousands of dinars)
Current Prices Constant Prices for 1962
Year Annual G.F.C.F. 1957=100 Annual G.F.C.F. 1957-100
1957 4,665.1 100 4,115.5 100
1958 5,565.6 119.3 6,065.8 118.6
1959 14,848.1 318.3 14,966.6 292.6
1960 22,814.0 489.0 22,243.3 . 434.8
1961 22,477.7 481.8 22,259.6 435.1
1962 4,710.5 101.0 4,710.5 92.1
1963 1,285.2 27.5 1,272.0 24.9
1964 500.0 10.7 472.5 9.2
1965 600.0 12.9 560.3 11.0
1966 576.a 12.5 . 522.8 10.2
1967 560.0 12.0 478.7 9.4
1968 565.4 14-1 590.0 11.5
1969 500.0 * 10.7 440.0 8.6
1970 480.0 10.3 414.4 8.1
\
Source: Hashim/ J. , 1975, p. 235.
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TABLE 24
Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Value 
Added by the Oil Industry for the Period 1957-70
at Current Prices 
(millions of dinars)
Total Wages
Annual Gross Value Gross Profit and Salaries
Year G.F.C.F. Added COil Production)(Oil Production)
1957 4.7 113.1 107.3 5.8
1958 5.6 175.4 169.2 6.2
1959 14.8 190.0 182.1 7.9
1960 22.8 208.1 199.0 9.1
1961 22.5 209.0 200.2 8.8
1962 4.7 210.2 201.5 8.7
1963 1.3 242.5 235.1 7.4
1964 0.5 270.9 262.9 8.0
1965 0.6 281.1 273.0 8.1
1966 0.6 298.5 290.4 8.1
1967 0.6 265.2 257.0 8.2
1968 0.7 334.6 327.0 7.6
1969 0.5 335.9 328.8 7.1
1970 0.5 362.6 355.0 7.6
Source: Hashim, J. , 1975, p. 240.
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TABLE 25
Contribution of the Oil Industry to Total 




Year (total) (oil industry) Percent
1957 106,290.1 4,665.1 4.4
1958. 97,872.2 5,565.1 5.7
1959 103,594.1 14,848.1 14.3
1960 120,239.9 22,814.0 19.0
1961 137,216.8 22,477.7 16.4
1962 119,233.5 4,710.5 4.0
1963 119,900.0 1,285.0 1.1
1964 147,600.0 500.0 0.3
1965 131,400.0 600.0 0.5
1966 144,700.0 576.5 0.4
1967 149,900.0 560.0 0.4
1968 154,200.0 656.4 0.4
1969 159,000.0 500.0 0.3
(1) G.D.F.C.F. = Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation.
(2) G.F.C.F. = Gross Fixed Capital Formation.
Source: Hashim, Jawad, 1972, p. 15.
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in the capital formation and expanding the productive base 
of the economy (Hashim, J., 1972, p. 7), the share of the 
oil industry has been declining. Consequently, it can be 
said that if the rate of growth of investment in the oil 
industry has been rising in accordance with that of the 
gross domestic capital formation, its contribution to the 
economy would have been larger and the GDP would have been 
at a higher level than the present level reached.
Capital Formation in Recent Years. Data for the con­
tribution of the oil industry to the gross domestic fixed 
capital formation are not available for the period 1971-76. 
The Central Statistical Organization, Iraq, published figures 
of G.F.C.F. for the mining sector which includes crude oil 
production and other mining activities, and figures of the 
G.D.F.C.F. until 1974, the data for 1973 and 1974 being 
only preliminary. Nevertheless, it can be estimated with 
fair accuracy, that the contribution of the oil industry 
to the G.D.F.C.F. has been rising from 0.27 percent in 
1970 to about 6 percent in 1974, due to the rising activities 
of INOC in exploration, development, and production.
Indeed, Iraq is investing heavily in the oil produc­
tion sector at the present time, in exploration, oil pro­
duction facilities, pipelines, export terminals, and crude 
oil tankers. Such trend in investment is expected to
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continue throughout the rest of the 1970's, in order to 
be consistent with Iraq's plans to expand oil export capa,- 
city to 4 million barrels daily by 1980.
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CHAPTER 7. CONTRIBUTION OF THE OIL INDUSTRY 
TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANS
Obstacles to Development
The obstacles to development of the poor countries 
have been grouped by Meier and Baldwin (1957,- p. 316) into 
three categories: (1) "market imperfections," (2) "inter­
national forces," and (3) "vicious circles." Very briefly 
speaking, market imperfections mean factor immobility, 
ignorance of market conditions, rigid social structure and 
lack of specialization which are characteristic market 
features in the poor countries. International forces in­
clude trade barriers, declining terms of trade, monopolistic 
competition, and the effect of technological change in the 
developed countries (Kindleberger, C.P., 1973, p. 78).
Vicious Circles. The most important obstacle to de­
velopment is what is termed as the vicious circle. Many 
obstacles to development are both a cause and a consequence 
of poverty; hence, they act in a circular relationship that 
perpetuates the low level of development. Such a vicious 
circle is shown in Figure 8 .
78
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Market Imperfections
Low Saving ^ ------------Low Real Income
Figure 8. The Vicious Circle
Source: Meier and Baldwin, 1957, p. 319.
Market imperfections coupled with capital deficiency 
result in low productivity which leads to low real income. 
Since real income is low, consumption constitutes the larger 
portion of it and little is left for saving. Little saving 
results in low level of investment and this, in turn, leads 
to low level of capital formation, and as such the circle 
continues.
Role of the Oil Revenues. The poor countries, in order 
to develop, must surmount the obstacles to development. The 
process of large scale development has already been started 
by the oil producing countries. By using the influx of 
foreign exchange, generated by oil exports, the link "low 
saving-low investment" in the vicious circle is being broken.
This process is going on in Iraq. The larger portions 
of the budgets allocated to economic development plans are 
financed by oil revenues. These plans are involved in all 
various aspects of development: investment in agriculture,
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manufacturing industries, electricity and water, human 
resources, infrastructure, and so on.
Investments create more employment opportunities and 
raise income. These factors lead to higher levels of con­
sumption and saving. As a result, demand increases and 
markets expand and, in turn, investment is more encouraged 
and asked for.' Human education, training, and improved 
health raise productivity and induce social change. Such 
factors help in paving the way to market perfections.
The Development Plans - Historical Perspective
First Stage. The first attempt of planned develop­
mental effort was started in 1950. The main stimulant to 
this was.the increase in oil revenues as a result of in­
creasing production from 4 million tons a year in 1949 to 
about 7 million tons in 1950. (Hashim, 1975b, p. 49).
A Development Board (D.B.) was established in 1950 to for­
mulate and implement the various development projects.
The D-. B. formulated two programs allocating for them 
70 percent of the oil revenues. An idea of the investment 
allocations for the various sectors of the economy can be 
obtained from'Table 26. Agriculture seems to have had the 
share of the lion in these investments, claiming about one- 
third of the allocations. The programs were a collection 
of unrelated infra-structural projects with no cost-benefit
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TABLE 26
Investment Allocations of the Development 
Programs for the Period (1951/52-60/61) 
(millions of dinars)
1951/52-56/57 1955/56-60/61
Sector Allocation Percent Allocation Percent
Agriculture 53.4 34.4 168.1 33.6
Industry 31.0 19.9 67.1 13.4
Transport and 
Communications 26.8 17.2 124.4 24.9
Building and Housing 18.0 11.6 123.2 24.6
Other Activities 26.2 16.9 ’ 17.3 3.5
Total 155.4 100.0 500.1 100.0
Source: Hashim, J., 1975b, Development Planning in Iraq,
p. 51.
T-1885 82
studies, investment criteria, or project evaluation methods 
were applied. Maybe Dr. Hashim's description (1975b, p. 52- 
of investment in the agriculture sector can give a picture 
of the kind of planning which dominated that period:
"However, the effort to lift up agricultural 
sector itself seems to have been only a partial 
and half-hearted one. Some flood control and 
irrigation projects were all that was started.
These projects, no doubt necessary in the first 
instance, would hardly cure the ills of the 
agricultural sector, in the absence of land 
reforms, better farming practices, provisions 
of necessary inputs like fertilizers, farm- 
machinery, and proper marketing facilities, 
and pricing policies. No attention seems to 
have been paid to these aspects. The benefits 
which could accrue as a result of the infra­
structural projects would take a long time to 
materialize, and in the absence of land reforms, 
would largely benefit the big landlords."
The first program was not completed; only 54.6 percent 
of the financial allocations were spent, when this program 
was overlapped by the second one. The second program was 
also not completed. Only 59.7 percent was accomplished 
when the revolution of July 1958 took place. Most of the 
allocations to these plans were financed by oil revenues.
Second Stage (1959-69) . After the July revolution, 
major changes were introduced and most of them, to mention 
a few, were (1) agrarian reform, (2) attention to education 
and health service, and (3) laws regulating working condi­
tions and social security.
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The D.B. was abolished and a planning board and a 
Ministry of Planning were established in 1959. A four-year 
provisional economic plan was introduced in 1959. It lasted 
for only two years when it was superceded in 1961 by a 
detailed economic plan (1961/62-65/66). This plan aimed 
at doubling the level of national income in ten years.
The total investment was estimated on the basis of the 
required rate of growth and an overall capital output ratio 
(Hashim, 1975b, p. 55). Due to the political upheavals in 
1963, this plan was terminated and substituted by transi­
tional annual plans for the years 1963, 1964, and 1965. 
During these years, investment fell drastically and some 
of the projects were suspended.
In 1965, a new economic plan was introduced for the 
period 1965-69. The main objectives of the plan were to 
accelerate the rate of economic growth and raise the stan­
dard of living; to restore equilibrium of the Iraqi economy 
by diversification of production; and to reduce dependence 
on oil revenues as a mere source of income and foreign 
exchange. Table 27 shows the investment allocations for 
the various sectors. The plan provided for an average rate 
of growth of 8 percent. Actual disbursements by the plan 
fell far short of the projected total and the target rate 
of growth was not reached (Quarterly Economic Review, 1976, 
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Transport and Communication 99.0 20.0
Building, Housing and
Social Services 122.5 141.0
Trade and Services 1.0 3.0
















Source: Hashim, J., 1975b, p. 59.
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Financing Development (1951/52-69/70)
As mentioned previously, the main stimulant for the 
start of developmental planning in Iraq was the increase in 
oil revenues as a result of increasing oil production and 
the application of the profit-sharing agreement. Thus, an 
investment budget was conceived and the government decided 
to allocate all the oil revenues to it. As a result of 
the increase in oil revenues and the needs of the ordinary 
budget for other sources of finance, the allocation from 
the oil revenues was reduced to 70 percent in 1952, and 
again to 50 percent in 1959. Nevertheless, foreign invest­
ments and loans have played but a small part in the Iraqi 
developmental process.
The pattern of financing the economic development pro­
grams and plans is shown in Table 28. Until the year 1960/61, 
oil revenues were almost the sole source of finance. Be­
tween 1961/62 and 1969/70, dependence on oil was reduced 
to about 50 percent and the sources of finance became more 
diversified. Foreign loans and profitable government enter­
prises were introduced in 1961/62 as another source of 
finance. The private sector was introduced for the first 
time as a source of finance for the development plan 1964/65- 
69/70 and its contribution to planned investment was esti­
mated at 22 percent.
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Shortcomings of the Period (1951/52-69/70)
The general feature which characterized developmental 
planning in Iraq for the above period is the general weakness 
in the level of execution of the plans. The total amount 
allocated to these plans in this period was 2015.7 million 
dinars, while actual expenditures were only 108 9.1 million 
dinars, which means a percentage of execution of only 54 
percent. This low level of execution was due to the many 
problems and difficulties surrounding the path of economic 
development at that time. Some of these difficulties can 
be summarized in the following points: (Ministry of Planning,
1971, p. 48).
1) Weakness, and sometimes total absence, of economical 
and technical studies of the proposed development projects.
2) Lack of talented managerial and executive cadre 
for the efficient management and execution of the plans.
3) Domination of the complicated government routine 
which contributed a large portion to the confusion and delay 
of the operation and execution of the plans.
4) Lack of statistical data, essential to the planning 
operations.
5) Absence of coordination between the various exe­
cutive bodies of the government.
6) Lack of coordination between government fiscal and 
investment policies which resulted in shortfalls in disburse­
ments against official allocations.
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The National Development Plan
Economic development at the beginning of this decade 
marked a new phase in planning and objectives. During this 
period, the vision of society to be attained was kept in 
view; and development was understood not only to en­
compass material progress, but also social and cultural 
evolution leading towards an advanced social system (Hashim, 
J., 1975b, p. 62).
With such ideas in mind, the national development plan, 
1970/71-74/75, was formulated. The objectives of the plan 
were: (a) balanced growth, (b) price stability, (c) increase
in the level of consumption, (d) encouraging private ini­
tiative and private capital in specified sectors by providing 
favorable environment, (e) diversification of exports, (f) 
balanced regional development, (g) reduction in the depen­
dence on oil, (h) economic integration and cooperation with 
other Arab countries.
As regards the role of the oil industry in this plan, 
oil revenues constituted 89.8 percent of the grand total 
of the plan's revenues (Ministry of Planning, 1975, p. 17). 
Tables 29 and 30 show the yearly receipts and expenditures 
of the national development plan. From these tables, three 
main differences can be seen between this plan and the five 
year economic plan of 1964/65-69/70, and they are: (a) the
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level of financial execution of the national development 
plan, although not perfect, but has far improved over that 
of the economic plan. While the average financial execution 
for the last plan was 65 percent, it reached an average of 
87 percent for this plan.(b) The total financial allocation 
for the economic plan was 687.5 million dinars, while the 
total financial allocation for the national development 
plan was about 2,047 million dinars at current prices, 
which was about three times that of the, economic plan, (c) 
Oil revenue financed about 47.5 percent of the economic 
plan, while it played a leading role in the national de­
velopment plan and financed about 90 percent of it.
These differences can be justified by (a) the whole­
hearted and sincere effort of the government in the formu­
lation a n d  execution of the plan on the one hand, and the 
experience gained throughout two decades of planning on 
the other hand, have helped, a great deal, in attaining a 
higher level of execution; (b) the immense increase in the 
oil revenues, due to the nationalization of the oil opera­
tions in 1972 and the tremendous increase in oil prices 
in 1973, have encouraged the government to increase the 
level of allocations to the 1973/74 and 1974/75 investment 
programs, and incorporate ambitious projects, leaning heavily 
on oil revenues as the main source of finance for this plan.
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The Investment Program of 1975
Through all the time, prior to 1975, the Ministry of 
Financehas followed a fiscal year which starts on the first 
of April of a calender year and ends on the 31st of March, 
the following year. In 1975, the Revolutionary Command 
Council (R.C.C.), decided to make the fiscal year coincident 
with the calender year as of 1976, for reasons of conven­
ience. The national development plan ended in March 31,
1975. An interim investment program was adopted for the 
nine months remaining from 1975, on the basis that the forth­
coming national development plan, 1976-80, will begin at 
the completion of this investment program, using calender 
or Gregorian years.
The main objectives of this investment program were 
(a) concentration on the strategic projects, (b) to solve 
the problems of bottlenecks in the supply of construction 
and raw materials, (c) the economic, social, and cultural 
development of the northern region of Iraq, and (d) the 
establishment of common projects with the other Arab coun­
tries in fulfillment of the economic integration of the 
Arab nation (Muhammad, H., 1975, p.*3).ft
The estimated receipts and allocations of this in­
vestment program are shown in Table 31. The main feature 
of this program is the size of its allocations. It is
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the largest investment program witnessed by the country, 
considering the rate of allocations assigned for nine months 
only, as compared with the previous investment programs.
As usual, oil revenues have been the main source of finance, 
making 65 percent of the receipts of the program. How­
ever, the share of oil revenues has declined as compared 
with its share of about 90 percent in financing the last 
national development plan. This is due to the effort of 
the government to diversify the origins of the revenues for 
the development plans and reduce dependence on oil.
The National Development Plan (1976-80)
Nothing official has been released about the forth­
coming national development plan, since it has not been 
finally approved, although eight months, as of now, have 
already elapsed from its period. The Quarterly Economic 
Review (1976, p. 7) has mentioned that heavy emphasis, in 
this plan, will be placed on the oil industry, petrochemicals, 
and non-oil industry; total investments in the plan will 
probably run at $33,780 million; and allocations to de­
velopment in 1976 are put at $5,045 million (I.D. 1,493.5 
million).
No official information has been obtained regarding 
the size of investments for the various years of the plan, 
the origin of receipts, or the financial allocation to the
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various sectors, except that the total investment for 1976 
will be 1,493.5 million dinars and the share of the indus­
trial sector will be 709 million dinars, which is 47 percent 
of the total allocations for 1976. (Ministry of Planning, 
1976, p. 1 and 137). However, one thing will be certain: 
the oil industry will again play its prominent role by pro­
viding most of'the revenues needed by this development plan.
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CHAPTER 8. IMPORTANCE OF THE OIL REVENUES 
TO THE ORDINARY BUDGETS
Oil revenues started occupying an important position
in financing the ordinary budgets since the time Iraq 
started receiving oil revenues. As mentioned earlier, 
due to the increase of oil production in 1950, revenues 
from oil doubled from 3.2 million dinars in 1949 to 6.7 
million dinars in 1950, a separate investment budget was 
conceived and all the oil revenues were allocated to it.
In 1952, as a result of increases in oil revenues as well 
as heavier pressures on the ordinary budget of the govern­
ment, the allocation of the oil revenues to the investment 
budget was reduced to 70 percent, while 30 percent went to 
the ordinary budget. Again in 1959, the allocation to the 
investment budget was reduced to 50 percent of the oil 
revenues, while the other 50 percent went to the ordinary 
budget (Hashim, J., 1975b, p. 69).
Table 32 shows the share of oil revenues in the or­
dinary budgets for the period 1956-69. As can be seen 
from this table, the share of oil revenues has been about 
30 percent until 1959. When the allocation to the ordin­




Share of Oil Revenues in the Ordinary Budgets 
for the Period 1956-69 
(millions of dinars) .
Total
Allocation to Share of Oil
Year Ordinary Budget Revenues Percent
1956 62.71 20.65 33
1957 61.85 14.65 24
1958 75.57 26.07 34
1959 89.72 43.30 48
1960 103.61 47.54 46
1961 120.70 58.12 48
1962 114.71 48.48 42
1963 126.77 57.24 45
1964 145.96 64.83 44
1965 179.13 67.72 38
1966 158.65 61.21 39
1967 210.36 75.83 36
1968 212.88 91.64 43
1969 260.74 84.53 32
Source: Al-Samarraie, S.A., 
of Iraq, p. 171.
1976, Financial Policy
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its share in financing the ordinary budget rose to an average 
of about 42 percent for the decade 1959-69.
Importance of the Ordinary Budget
Although the ordinary budget is a budget of consump­
tion, and despite the fact that national defense and security 
have been taking from it an average of 50 percent for the 
last six years, yet, it plays a role of paramount importance 
in the life of the nation. It provides wages and salaries 
for the employees of the government; and education, health 
service, and social care for the masses (see Table 33).
These services are as important as investment itself, since 
education and good health help to create a more able society 
and improve the productivity of the working classes.
Moreover, the ordinary budget helps in creating more 
jobs and absorbs a part of unemployment, although this is 
more the responsibility of investment and long term economic 
development planning. Since the ordinary budget is mainly 
for services, the human element cost, i.e. wages and salaries, 
forms the larger portion of it. For example, wages, salaries, 
and benefits, not ,shown in the table, have made 57.3 percent 
of the ordinary budget in 1973/74. Finally, the ordinary 
budget bears the responsibility of operating and maintaining 
the various projects accomplished by the investment programs 
and already turned over to the various ministries and 
administrations of the government (Abdul Kareem, 1973, p. 3).
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Recent Role of Oil Revenues
Table 34 shows the share of oil revenues in the ordin­
ary budgets for the period 1970/71-75. The normal budget 
has expanded considerably since 1973. This is partly due 
to the increasing obligations of the government, but mainly 
due to the exceptionally high expenditures on national de­
fence and security. Compared with 1972/73, expenditures 
on national defence and security rose to 140 percent in 
1973/74, 576 percent in 1974/75, and 269 percent for the 
nine month period in 1975. However, such rise in expendi­
ture seems to have been mainly satisfied by the increasing 
share of oil revenues in the budget which increased from 
40 percent in 1972/73 to 69 percent in 1973/74, 88 percent 
in 1974/75, and 74 percent in 1975.
The share of oil revenues has been about 3 0 percent 
of the budget until 1959, and then increased to about 40 
percent after that period. Except for sudden increases 
in the budget due to exceptional expenditures, such as 
that on national defence which have largely been encouraged 
and satisfied by the excessive incomes from the oil industry, 
the oil revenues will keep an average share of about 40 . 
percent in the finance of the ordinary budget. This trend 
is likely to continue that way for quite some years to come 




Share of Oil Revenues in the Ordinary Budgets 
for the Period 1970/71-75 
(thousands of dinars)
Total Allocation Share 
to Ordinary of Oil
Year Budget Revenues Percent
1970/71 292,562 114,434 39
1971/72 344,805 179,269 52
1972/73 270,530 109,303 40
1973/74 597,853 411,617 69
1974/75(1) 1,283,686 1,123,319 88
1975 (2) 678,492 500,000 74
(1) Revised estimates
(2) Estimates, covering the period April 1-Dec. 31, 1975 
according to the R.C.C. decision.
f
Source: Central Bank of Iraq, Bulletin, 1975, p. 25.
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of finance such as taxes, duties, and profits of govern­
ment enterprises, a course which should be followed grad-* 
ually, if the government plans to reduce its dependence on 
oil in financing the ordinary budget.
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CHAPTER 9. CONTRIBUTION OF THE OIL INDUSTRY
TO EMPLOYMENT
Characteristics of the Labor Force
The labor force in the oil industry has at least three 
characteristics. First, it has a very high capital-labor 
ratio. Second, once this industry reaches the stage of 
maturity, the size of the labor force tends to decline per 
unit of output and frequently in absolute number (Table 35). 
Third, labor requirement in oil production usually stands 
at a lower level than that in other oil processing indus­
tries (Sayegh, K.S., 1968, p. 87).
Maybe the most striking feature of the oil industry 
is its capital intensive nature. Consequently, it usually 
has a relatively small labor force, and the investment and 
value added per worker is very high in this industry com­
pared to other industries. This was true, especially for 
the early periods of the industry in Iraq, when the rest 
of the industry was primitive in its methods and equipment, 
employing much labor per unit of capital, owing to the low 
productivity and abundance of labor and scarcity of skill 
and capital. Another feature of the oil-industry is that
103
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the level of employment in oil production is much lower 
than that in refining; it takes roughly 3.5 times as many 
man days to produce a ton of refined products as a ton of 
crude oil (Issawi and Yeganeh, 1962, p. 150). Therefore, 
the contribution of the oil companies to employment has 
been limited, since their operations has been mainly con­
fined to oil production.
The size of the labor force, in the oil industry, fluc­
tuates according to the activity being carried out. Table 35 
shows the size of employment for a number of selected years 
between 1947 and 1964. While the number employed was 14,556 
in 1948, it rose to a peak of 16,702 in 1961 and dropped in 1964 
to 11,245, the lowest in the appraised period. The reason 
was that the oil companies were engaged in exploration, de­
velopment, and production activities in the 1950's, while 
they comfined their activities to production only after 
the promulgation of Law No. 80 in 1961.
Another feature which characterizes employment in the 
oil industry almost exclusively in the develdping countries 
is its* high wage rates compared to those earned in other 
branches of the economy. Table 36 shows the number of em­
ployees and total wages paid by all oil companies in 1969 
excluding INOC. The annual average wage rate per employee 
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Source: Central Statistical Organization, 1970, adapted 
from tables 10 and 11.
TABLE 37
Employment in the Oil Industry 
for the Period 1970-73
Company 1970 1971 1972 1973
I.N.O.C. 1,095 2,250 3,058 3,851
i.e.0.0. 5,625 5,719 5,573 6,228
B.P.C. 3,817 3,883 3,899 4,030
Total 10,537 11,852 12,530 14,109
Source: Ministry of Oil, Economic Dept., July 1976,
"written communication."
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year for the rest of the industries (C.S.0., 1972, p. 99), 
and 700 dinars for petrochemical and refining industries 
which are the highest paid in the country, excluding the 
oil companies (Ministry of Planning, Industrial Dept.,
July 1976, oral communication).
Therefore, it could be presumed that the oil industry 
has attracted and retained a higher proportion of able in­
dustrial workers and technicians. This is one of the argu­
ments advanced by some economists against export oriented 
resource development. They contend that the export sector, 
due to higher wages, draws skilled labor .from the hinterland 
(backwash effects), leaving the nonexport sector poorer than 
before (Mikesell, 1973, p. 17). But to say that the oil 
companies have harmed the Iraqi economy in this way is to 
do them injustice. The oil companies, since the beginning 
of the industry in Iraq, have set up unique training pro­
grams whether through on-the-job training, industrial 
training centers, or training abroad. On the contrary, 
it could be said that the oil industry has benefitted the 
rest of the economy through its high labor turnover supplying 
it with much needed skilled and semi-skilled workers.^
Employment in Recent Years
Employment in the oil industry has stagnated after 
1961, reaching a low figure of 8,366 in 1969, excluding 
INOC. However, in 1968, INOC started active exploration,
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development, and production programs. As a result, the 
number of employees rose from 350 before 1968 to 4,558 in 
1974 (INOC, 1974, p. 2).
Table 37 shows number of employees in the oil produc­
tion industry for the period 1970-7 3. Due to the rising 
activities of INOC, employment increased from 1,095 in 1970 
to 3,851 in 1973 with an annual average rate of growth of 
53 percent. After nationalization of IPC in 1972, explora­
tion and development activities were revived and employment 
rose from 5,573, in 1972 to 6,228 in 1973, a rise of 12 
percent. The annual average rate of growth for the total 
employed has been 10 percent for the period 1970-73. This 
rate of growth is expected to decline considerably until 
it levels off in 1980 as production reaches its target of 
4 million barrels daily, and the industry controlled by 
INOC reaches the stage of maturity.
Whatever may be said about employment in the oil pro­
duction industry and its growth rate, it remains very small 
compared with total employment in the country. Table 38 
shows estimates of employment in the mining and quarrying 
sector and total employment in Iraq. The contribution of 
this sector to total employment does not go beyond 0. 68 percent 
in any year which is very small indeed. In 1975, the
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Estimated Employment in Mining and Quarrying 
and Total Employment in Iraq for the period 197 4-80
Employment in Total
Year Mining and Quarrying Employment Percent
1974 19,200 2,851,400 .67
1975 20,000 2,941,400 .68
1976 20,800 3,067,200 .68
1977 21,650 3,198,950 .68
1978 22,600 3,336,850 .68
1979 23,500 3,481,300 .68
1980 24,500 3,632,600 .67
Source: Ministry of Planning, Economic Dept., 
June, 1976, "written communication."
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contribution by sectors to total employment was as follows: 
agriculture 56.25 percent, mining and quarrying 0.68 percent 
manufacturing industries 6.29 percent, electricity and water
0.51 percent, constructions 2.62 percent, trade 5.7 8 percent 
communication 5.78 percent, and services 22.1 percent. The 
oil production industry usually makes about 7 0-75 percent 
of the labor force in the mining,and quarrying sector. This 
means that the contribution of the oil industry to total 
employment in the country is only about 0.5 percent which 
is negligible compared with the size of the labor force in 
agriculture or services. Yet, this tiny labor force contri­
buted an annual average of 30 percent of the value added by 
the.nation for the period 1969-74 (see Table 20). Perhaps 
the oil industry's most striking characteristic, its high 
capital-labor ratio and high value added per worker, can 
very well manifest itself in the instance just mentioned.
Importance of the Oil Industry in Training Manpower
One of the main features of under-developed economy is 
its predominantly illiterate and unskilled labor force with 
jvery low levels of productivity. Thus, investment in human 
resources such as education and training is indispensable 
for the developing economies.
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Since the start of oil industry in Iraq, on-the-job 
training has been the chief technique to train people with 
no industrial background. After the 1950'.s, the oil com­
panies have set out on a vastly more ambitious course of 
training. The formal training courses undertaken-by the oil 
companies were the following: apprentice courses, artisan
trainee courses, commercial courses, training in departments, 
adult evening courses, and training courses in the United 
Kingdom (Sayegh, 1968, p. 89). Moreover, the IPC group 
were required by the government to send 50 Iraqi students 
abroad each year to obtain higher education in the various 
fields required by the oil industry in particular and the 
country in general.
In 1971, INOC has opened its own training center. This 
training center was intended to supply the oil industry in 
particular, and the rest of the economy in general, with 
skilled workers and technicians. Supervised by specialists 
in the varied and complex fields of the oil industry, this 
center accepted 265 students in 1972. These students were 
graduates of high and technical schools. The period of 
training is one to two years (Ministry of Oil, 1973, p. -59) .
Among the specialties provided by the center at the 
present time are the following: general mechanical and
electrical technology, instrumentation, communication, oil 
and gas well drilling, oil and gas production, mud and well
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testing, chemical analysis, and refining and unit operation 
(INOC, 1975a, p. 19-20). The total graduates from this 





The increase in 1974 over the previous years was thus 52 
percent (INOC, 1975b, p. 76) .
The impact of investment in human resources on the eco­
nomy is very difficult to quantify, since education and 
training, like any other social overhead capital, have no 
direct contribution to the national income, they improve 
the ability to produce output. However, it is needless to 
say that training in the oil industry has certainly bene­
fited the economy, by raising the productivity of the oil 
industry itself as well as supplying the rest of the economy 
with skilled workers, technicians, and engineers who have 
received their training through petroleum training centers, 
apprenticeships, or educational institutions abroad.
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CHAPTER 10. LINKAGES OF THE OIL INDUSTRY
Forward and Backward Linkages
The process by which one product stimulates the pro­
duction of others and thereby encourages growth has been 
called linkages by Hirschman (1960, p. 100). Forward link-
does not by its nature cater exclusively to final demand 
so that it attracts other industries to the area to take 
advantage of cheap or available inputs. Backward linkages 
occur when an industry needs inputs and creates such a 
strong demand for them that new industries spring into 
being to satisfy the need. To cite an example, the estab­
lishment of a cement industry might induce the manufacture 
of multi-wall bags through backward linkage and a cement 
block industry through forward linkage.
Hirschman classified petroleum production as an in­
dustry that has low backward linkage and.high forward link­
age. Mikesell (1973, p. 25) states that petroleum industry 
does not have strong backward linkage even in the developed 
countries. In the case of Iraq, the petroleum production
ages are found when an industry produces an output that
113
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industry has no existent backward linkage at all. Perhaps 
this can be justified by the fact that oil production, being 
a primary commodity industry, does not need inputs as other 
non-primary commodity industries do. This is on the one hand 
On the other hand, the inputs needed by the oil industry such 
as tools, equipment, spare parts, pipes, vessels, etc., are 
either very specialized or, if not specialized, the demand 
on them is of sporadic nature and not of economic size as to 
warrant the establishment of such industries.
Forward Linkages
Despite the fact that oil and natural gas industry 
exhibits strong forward linkages, this feature did not 
induce the establishment in Iraq of such industries as to 
benefit from the cheap inputs like Crude oil and natural 
gas for oil processing and .petrochemical industries.
Refining. Iraq has been one of the smallest refiners 
in the world compared with its output of crude oil production 
Table 39 shows the refining capacity of Iraq compared with 
some selected countries. The reason for this small refining 
capacity was the construction of refineries in the consuming 
centers. European and other consumers prefer to have the 
refining done at home for a variety of reasons, strategic, 
political, financial, and economic.
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TABLE 39
Daily Refining Capacity of Iraq 
and Selected Countries 
(thousands of barrels)
Country 1958 1966 1970 1973
Iraq 45 75 102 172
Kuwait 190 360 500 500
S. Arabia 190 270 380 400
U.S.A. 9,200 10,740 10,290 13,630
World 20,800 34,740 48,220 60,760
Source: El-Zaim, I., 1975 p. 17.
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Consuming countries prefer to become independent of 
imports of refined oil, thus gaining more flexibility in 
securing the desired oil products. Also, the consuming 
countries want to reduce foreign exchange expenditure through 
saving the value added by refining crude oil. Refining also 
creates employment opportunities since it is more labor- 
intensive than' crude oil production; as mentioned before, 
in the Middle East, it takes roughly 3.5 times as many 
man-days to produce a ton of refined products as a ton of 
crude oil; in Iraq, this figure was 3.6 in 1973. Table 40 
shows the total number of employees in the Oil Refineries 
Administration of Iraq for the period 1970-73.
TABLE 40






Source: Ministry of Oil, Economic Dept., July 1976,
"written communication."
Another advantage of domestic refining is that it opens 
new opportunities for investment such as the utilization of 
refinery by-products and gases for petrochemical industries 
(Issawi and Yeganeh, 1960, p. 79).
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But the most important reason which precluded the con­
struction of oil refineries in Iraq was the nature of con­
cessions itself. The oil companies were not obligated to 
establish a refining industry in Iraq on commercial basis. 
They only undertook, according to Article 15 of the 1925 
convention, to meet local consumption and for this purpose 
they established Rafidain Oil Company to market, locally, 
the oil products refined in the small Al-Wand refinery 
(El-Zaim, 1975, p. 19). The situation in Venezuela was 
far better; article 5 of the Law of Hydrocarbons of 194 3, 
obligated the oil companies to refine locally at least 10 
percent of the petroleum produced locally; in 1950, the 
minimum figure was raised to 15 percent, and in 1964 about 
32 percent of domestically produced crude was refined (Issâ  
and Yeganeh, p. 79, and Harris, 1973, p. 142).
TABLE 41
Daily Oil Production and Refining Capacity of Iraq





1958 731.3 45 cr> • to
1966 1,392.2 75 5.4
1970 1,546.0 102 6.6
1973 2,018.0 172 8.5
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Table 41 shows refining capacity as a percentage of 
crude oil produced for selected years. Refining capacity ‘ 
is usually larger than the actual amount of- crude oil re­
fined domestically. In 1975, the refining capacity rose to
192,000 barrels daily which was about 8.5 percent of crude 
oil produced in that year. Such capacity is indeed very 
small since refineries are only erected in Iraq to meet 
local consumption and not for export. This state of affairs 
constituted a loss to Iraq in employment opportunities, foreign 
exchange due to the value added, and the probable establish­
ment of petrochemical industries.
Petrochemicals. The case of petrochemical industry 
in Iraq was worse than refining. The concession agreement 
did not impose on the companies the obligation of exploita­
tion or even conservation of the natural gas, apart from 
having to "maintain in good working order all borings, so 
long as they are economically productive '(Article 7 of 1925 
cohvention)(Issawi and Yeganeh, p. 95). This accounts for 
the fact that almost all the natural gas produced in associa­
tion with crude oil was flared while a small percentage of 
it was consumed (see Table 8 , Chapter 3). •
In 1962, the government started utilizing the associated 
natural gas of the south and completed the erection of a gas 
gathering system, a dehydration plant, and a pipeline to 
take Rumaila gas to a power plant and paper mill in Basrah 
for energy purposes, and to a fertilizers plant as a raw
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material. In 1971 the fertilizers plant was completed with 
a daily capacity of 400 tons ammonium sulphate and 160 tons, of 
urea. The capital expenditure of this plant was 11 million 
dinars and the total number of employees was 792 in 1973 
(Ministry of Industry, 1975, p. 44).
In 1959, the government started utilizing the associated 
gas of the north by completing a pipeline to carry gas from 
Kirkuk area to Dibis power plant. A sulpher recovery plant 
was erected at Kirkuk in 1968 to treat sour gas and produce 
120 thousand tons of pure sulpher a year. The capital expen­
diture of this plant was 10 million dinars and the total 
number of employees in 1973 was 444. Two pipelines were 
built to take 44 MMSCF/day of dry gas and 310,000 ton/year 
of liquified petroleum gas from this plant to Taji gas pro­
cessing plant in Baghdad. The cost of these transmission 
pipelines was about 6 million dinars. The Taji plant in 
Baghdad was completed in 1968 with a capital expenditure of 
3.4 million dinars, to produce 136,000 tons/year of L.P. 
gas, 100,000 tons/year of propane, and 74,000 tons/year of 
natural gasoline. The total number employed at this plant 
was 555 in 1973 (Ministry of Oil, 1970b, p. 50-53).
Future Projects. Concerning refining activities, ex­
pansion of the existing Basrah refinery began in 1976 and 
will lift capacity from 70,000 barrels/day to 140,000
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barrels/day. A turn-key contract worth $100 million was 
awarded to build a 60,000-metric ton/year lube plant at 
Daura refinery, Baghdad, with completion slated for 1978.
As for export refineries, plans are at an advanced stage 
for the construction of two 15 million ton/year for export 
purposes (Quarterly Economic Review, 1976, p. 11, and Oil 
and Gas Journal, Oct. 13, 1975, p. 23).
As regards petrochemicals, expansion of the existing 
fertilizers plant is already under way to produce 1,300 
ton/day of urea. A contract of $565 million was already 
awarded to build a new fertilizer plant at Basrah; the pro­
ject will include two 500,000 ton/year urea plants and two
400,000 ton/year ammonia plants. Completion of the facilities 
is slated for mid-1979. A contract was awarded in mid-1973 
for a 120,000 ton/year ethylene plant at Basrah; a proposal 
has been submitted to the government for a $2.3 billion 
petrochemical complex in Basrah which would include a 200,000 
ton/year ethylene plant. An LPG plant is to be constructed 
at Basrah with investment of $15.2 million; the output from 
this unit will be 200,000 tons/year of L.P.G. A gas project 
has been formulated which envisages the export of 3.8 million 
tons a year of natural gas liquids from associated gas pro­
duced in the fields of Basrah area (Oil and Gas Journal,
Oct. 13, 1976, p. 23; Fallon, 1974, p. 139; and Quarterly 
Economic Review, No. 2, 1976, p. 7).
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No data has been obtained on the contribution of the 
future refining and petrochemical industry to the net foreign 
exchange earnings or employment in Iraq. Undoubtedly, the 
development of a successful refining and petrochemical in­
dustry will enhance the progress of the economy. However, 
it is worth mentioning that the success of such industry 
will depend, to a large extent, on the size of market that 
it can obtain for its output.
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study reveals that the oil industry of Iraq has 
a dominant role in the economy, and that oil revenues in the 
- form of foreign exchange earnings are of paramount importance.
Iraq is a developing country endeavoring to surmount 
the obstacles standing in the way of its development. The 
most difficult obstacle is the vicious circle of poverty 
which leads to low investment and no progress. In Iraq, 
oil revenues are being used to break the vicious circle.
Investment is vital for a developing country since it 
is the only way to broaden the productive base of the economy. 
Since the developing countries do not manufacture capital 
goods, nor do they posses the technological knowledge essen­
tial for progress, they need to import both. To import 
capital goods and technology, the two essential ingredients 
of investment, foreign exchange is needed.
About 95 percent of the foreign exchange earnings 
of the country are made of oil revenues. These revenues 
are shared between the ordinary and investment budgets. More 
important to Iraq is to concentrate on investment in order to
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enhance the productive base of the economy. Petroleum is 
a depletable resource, and at the present time oil produc­
tion is contributing about one-third of the national product.. 
By promoting the other productive sectors of the economy 
through investment, a gradual substitution for the effect 
of oil is being achieved. Such achievement is one of the 
primary goals of development planning.
Investment through development planning is the most 
important activity taking place in the country. However, 
economic development planning in Iraq is not without its 
shortcomings. Such shortcomings can be summarized briefly 
in the following four points:
(1) Allocation of oil revenues: At the beginning of
development planning, all the oil revenues were allocated 
for investment. Such allocation shrank to 70 percent and 
later to 50 percent. This meant the deviation of oil revenues 
from investment to consumption thereby gravely inflating 
the ordinary budget and squeezing the investment budget.
The government should increase its ability to promote 
other sources of finance for the ordinary budget and direct 
the oil revenues to the productive goals.of development . 
planning. This is on the one hand? on the other hand, the 
internal structure of the Ordinary budget should be modified 
in favor of social overhead capital in order to increase
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expenditure on education and training, health care, and 
other social services.
(2) Magnitude of investments: Fluctuations of the
allocations for the investment and ordinary budgets indi­
cate a pattern of planning such that the amounts of in­
vestment and consumption respond in accordance with the 
magnitude of oil revenues .being received and not the other 
way around.
Such pattern of planning entailed the inclusion of 
projects insufficiently studied and unnecessary for that 
period of development, and the inflation of the ordinary 
budget, just to expend the extra amount of oil revenues 
obtained, or caused the postponement or elimination of 
important projects in case of the deficiency of oil revenues
Rational planning calls for the formulation of develop­
ment programs according to the desired goals and growth 
objectives within the limits of the country's resources and 
capabilities, and then setting out to secure the sources 
of revenues to finance such programs. The amount of oil 
production should, therefore, be tailored in accordance 
with the actual needs to finance, arid in cooperation with 
other sources of revenues, the actual needs of the invest­
ment budgets and, if necessary, the ordinary budgets.
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(3) Execution performance: The execution of the plans
has been generally poor during the 1950's and 1960's al­
though it improved substantially during the 1970's. This 
shortfall in execution is due to the imbalance in factor 
endowments of the country. Capital is abundant and gener­
ally accessible, but skilled labor, and managerial and ad­
ministrative talents are in short supply. The lack of in­
frastructure such as ports, transport facilities, and storage 
capacity, and the physical bottlenecks in the supply of raw 
and construction material contribute a great deal to the 
delay in the execution of the programs.
Such factoral imbalance leads to weak investment ab­
sorptive capacity. The causes of weak absorptive capacity 
have been given ,a lesser attention. Planners should pay 
their utmost attention to investment in human resources and 
improvement of infrastructure in order to create greater 
competence and better environment for execution. Since 
human capital takes a longer time to build up, the much needed 
cooperant factors, human or material, should be imported 
whenever feasible.
(4) Industrialization of oil and gas: Oil has been
looked at as a source of finance for the government budgets 
and the development of oil processing and petro-chemical 
industries has been very poor.
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Indeed, oil and gas can form the backbone of the in­
dustrial base of the Iraqi economy, and planners should 
pay their utmost attention to this prospect. Oil processing 
and petro-chemical industries will enjoy the property of 
their input of raw materials being very cheap and in great 
abundance. These industries will be able to produce hun­
dreds of commodities and could have absolute and compara­
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